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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the will, and determined that the "old" shares should pass in "new"
form. He, however, unwarrantedly ignored § 14 of the Wills Act and
and was sidetracked by the ademption argument.
The holding of the instant case demands that the practicing attorney
exercise extreme caution in the drafting of a will to pass shares of stock.
The intent to pass the shares owned at the writing and thus any split
shares, if that is the goal, must be explicitly stated in order to preclude
a frustration of the testator's purpose.
Mark A. Rock
EMINENT DOMAIN-EVIDENCE OF POST-CONDEMNATION SALE-Noting
the division in authorities, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds that
evidence of the sale price of comparable property may be admissible, even
though the sale occurred subsequent to the taking.
Manning v. The Redevelopment Authority of Newport, R.I., -R.I.-,
238 A.2d 378 (1968).
Condemnation proceedings were instituted in the Superior Court of Rhode
Island by plaintiff, an owner of an improved parcel of real estate (Y
property), for the assessment of damages for the taking by defendant,
a redevelopment agency. The land was being taken in connection with
an urban renewal project. Real estate experts who appeared for each of
the parties based their respective opinions of the condemned parcel's
market value upon the sale prices of supposedly similar and comparable
properties. One expert for the plaintiff fixed the value at $39,000 and
another at 38,300; the defendant's sole expert valued the parcel at
$22,000. The defendant's expert stated that he relied in substantial part
in his appraisal upon the sale price of X property, an (allegedly) similar
parcel of property which he located on the same street and in the same
neighborhood as the property in litigation but which had a fixed sale date
of about four months after the condemnation of Y property. He was then
questioned generally about those factors which in his opinion made that
property comparable, and in addition, was asked to give its sale price. The
plaintiff objected and the trial judge sustained, excluding the testimony
on the ground that the sale of X real estate occurred subsequent to rather
than before the taking, and for the additional reason that it would be
too time consuming to permit inquiry into whether the urban renewal
project, which prompted the taking had introduced a new valuation in-
fluence and had thereby materially affected the sale of X property. The
trial judge, sitting without a jury, assessed damages at $36,500.
The defendant appealed the judgement to the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island and attributed what it claimed to be an excessive award to alleg-
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edly erroneous rulings by the trial judge excluding evidence as to the sale
of what defendant argued was a comparable parcel of real estate. Held,
it was error to automatically bar evidence of sale of otherwise comparable
property merely because it occurred subsequent to the condemnation.'
When property of a private owner is "taken" for public use without his
consent, the United States Constitution states that just compensation
must be paid to such owner.2 The courts have uniformly construed the
term "just compensation" as requiring compensation equivalent to the
fair market value of the property "taken", determined at the time of the
taking, i.e. the price at which the owner might have acutally sold the
property at or about the time of the taking.'
In eminent domain or condemnation proceedings, the courts of all
jurisdictions regard evidence of recent selling prices of properties similar
to, and in the same neighborhood as the property taken, as being of ma-
terial assistance to the trier of fact in determining the fair market value
of property taken by condemnation.4 One authority stated that, "it is an
unusual case in which no evidence of sales of neighboring land can be
offered which will not be in some degree helpful."' Therefore, sale prices
of comparable property are relevant to the value of the property in ques-
tion, and may be introduced into evidence for either of three purposes:
(a) on direct examination of expert or lay witnesses as independent
substantive evidence of the value of property to which the comparison
relates; 6
(b) on direct examination of the value-witness to give an account of
the factual basis upon which he founds his opinion on the issue of value
of real estate in controversy, i.e. admissible not as direct evidence of
1. The judgement of the lower court as to the amount of damages was affirmed. The
basis of the court's ruling was that in absence of an offer of proof that the rejected testimony
would have been that the sale price of the alleged comparable property sold subsequent to
the condemnation had not been materially affected by the taking of Y property, a ruling
excluding testimony as to the comparability of the property sold could not be found pre-
judical though erroneous. See note 25 infra.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; The Fifth Amendment restraint on power of eminent domain
is deemed incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and hence is a
limitation on state action as well. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
3. 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DoMrN 15 (2d ed. 1953); United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). The measure of compensation is not the value to the
owner or the special value to the taker.
4. Id. at § 137; 5 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOArm 21.3 (3d ed. 1962).
5. 5 NICHOLS, supra note 4, at 431.
6. The price paid for similar land, when admitted as independent evidence of value,
must be proved with as much formality as any other material fact, and witnesses are not
permitted to testify in regard to sales unless they were parties thereto, or who were brokers
who effected the sale, or in some other manner knew the price paid of their own knowledge,
and not as a matter of common knowledge or hearsay. Id. at 431-32.
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value of the property under consideration, but in support of the opinion
testified to by the expert as to the value of the property taken; 7
(c) on cross-examination of the value-witness to test his knowledge,
experience and investigation and thus affect the weight given to his
opinion.8
Certain preliminary requirements must be observed before evidence
of comparable sales may be introduced into evidence for whichever of
the above stated purposes. The three most important limitations concern:
(a) degree of similarity between the property that was the subject of the
sale and the property which is being valued; (b) proximity between date
of sale and date of valuation (taking); (c) the nature of the sale, as
determined by the circumstances under which it was made. As is often
stated by the courts, the best criterion of what constitutes just compensa-
tion for property taken by exercise of eminent domain power is its fair
market value as evidenced by "prices paid at or about the time of the
taking at voluntary sales in the open market by willing buyers to willing
sellers for parcels substantially similar and comparable to that taken." 9
Since there are many factors to be considered such as proximity in
location, size, general adaptability and improvements, there can be no
fixed definition of "similarly situated" or general rule which can be given
regarding the degree of similarity which must exist to make such evidence
admissible since no two properties are alike. It must necessarily vary with
7. For a discussion of opinion evidence and persons who may qualify as valuation
witnesses, see 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 3, at §§ 130-135, 5 NIcHoLs, supra note 4, at § 18.
8. In most jurisdictions, the courts have followed the rule that evidence of any sale or
contract to sell other similar property in the neighborhood is admissible on direct examination
to prove the market value of the property in question. The majority rule is sometimes called
the "Massachusetts" rule. In some jurisdictions, the courts have taken the contrary view
and have excluded such evidence on direct examination. The exclusion is based on the notion
that any attempt intelligently to infer the value of the instant property from the sale price
of a different piece of property would raise too many collateral issues rather than in the
belief that evidence of sales is irrelevant in determining market value. In these jurisdictions,
evidence of sales is permitted on cross-examination of an expert witness testifying as to
value, for the purpose of testing his credibility if the direct testimony of the witness shows
that his opinion was predicated on knowledge of comparable sale. This rule is also known as
the "Pennsylvania" rule. However, many jurisdictions that had once adhered to the
"Pennsylvania" rule have adopted either by judicial or statutory change in such rule against
the admissibility of evidence of comparable sales on direct examination. The rule has
radically been changed in Pennsylvania under the new Eminent Domain Code, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26 §§ 1-101 to -903 (1964), specifically see § 705(2)(i). This subclause allows
evidence on both direct and cross-examination of valuation witnesses regardless of whether
they relied on or based their opinion on the sale. Such evidnce is also admissible as evidence
of market value as well as for credibility purposes. For a fuller discussion of this problem and
for the rule followed in a particular jurisdiction see 5 NicHoLs, supra note 4, at § 21.3.
9. 238 A.2d at 380. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) ; Westchester County
Park Commission v. United States, 143 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1944).
[Vol. 6:410
RECENT DECISIONS
the circumstances of each case.' Whether there is sufficient similarity
between the property taken and the property which is the subject of the
sale in evidence (so that the sale price of one will be of assistance in
arriving at the value of the other) is necessarily left to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge. The discretion of the trial court is not however
unlimited, and if evidence of sales which was admissible as a matter of
law is excluded, or evidence of sales which was inadmissible as a matter
of law is admitted, the verdict will be set aside upon exceptions properly
taken."
Sale of neighboring land, no matter how similar to the land taken, is
not admissible unless the sale was within a reasonable time of the taking.
What constitutes reasonable time is a question left to the discretion of
the trial judge.' 2 Remoteness in point of time will condemn the eviden-
tiary value of a sale where there has been such a change in conditions
during the interval as to make the sale an unreliable test of value.'"
Therefore courts are in agreement that in appropriate circumstances evi-
dence of pre-condemnation sales is admissible. On the issue of whether
testimony of a post-condemnation sale may be admitted into evidence,
there is a conflict of authority. 4 The trial court, in the instant case, ex-
cluded testimony concerning the post-condemnation sale price of X real
estate, not on the ground that the 112 day interval between the taking and
the sale made it too remote as a matter of law, but because the sale of X
real estate occurred subsequent to rather than before the taking, i.e. the
trial court ruled as a matter of law that testimony concerning any post-
condemnation sale may not be admitted into evidence. 15
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island had not decided, prior to the
instant case, whether testimony of a post-condemnation sale is admissible.
The question to be resolved by the instant court was therefore whether
there is any sound or logical reason which requires it to differentiate be-
tween pre-condemnation and post-condemnation sales. One authority
stated that:
Generally speaking, the courts make no distinction between sales
occurring prior to the taking and sales consummated after the
date when title has vested in the condemnor. They usually admit
the latter type of evidence, sometimes qualifying their ruling by
stating that the sale must not be too remote in time or that there
must be no drastic change in market conditions. 6
10. For a general discussion see 1 ORGEL, supra note 3, at § 138; 5 NICHoLS, supra note
4, at § 21.31.
11. Id.
12. Id. at § 139, 21.31(2).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 238 A.2d at 380.
16. 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 3, at § 139, p. 591.
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Another authority, while conceding ample authority to the contrary,
stated that "evidence of sales made subsequent to the taking are not ad-
missible unless made almost simultaneously with the taking." 17
The exclusionary rule is sometimes justified on the ground that a sub-
sequent sale of property located in the vicinity of the property taken is
really not comparable because such sales might have been affected by the
taking itself, i.e. the sale will necessarily reflect an enhancement of or a
diminuation in price which is attributable to the project or improvement
(the construction of which the right to acquire by eminent domain was
exercised) and thus would be inadmissible since fair market value must
be established without any reference to condemnation. 8
The decided cases which have allowed testimony as to post-condemna-
tion sales, forward the proposition that although many times there is a
possibility that the project which occasioned the taking resulted in the
value of the neighboring land being inflated or deflated, that possibility
does not warrant a presumption that there was an effect on price in any
given case. Therefore as long as a likelihood exists that the price sought
to be offered was not materially affected by the project occasioning the
condemnation, the opportunity to present evidence to establish this fact
should not be foreclosed by a hard and fast exclusionary rule prohibiting
evidence of after condemnation sale prices.19
Following the rationale of the above cases, the instant court held that
the trial judge rather than automatically barring evidence of a sale of
otherwise comparable property merely because it occurred subsequent to
condemnation, should first determine if the price paid was so materially
distorted as to deprive the property sold of its comparability. The resolu-
tion of that issue and others, will determine the other property was suffi-
17. 5 NicHOLS, supra note 4, at § 21.31(2), p. 456.
18. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 303 (1893); Jayson v. United
States, 294 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1961) ; International Paper Co. v. United States, 22 F.2d 201,
209 (5th Cir. 1955) ; District of Columbia v. Lot 813 in Square 568, 232 F. Supp. 714, 719
(D.D.C. 1964), aff'd Rubenstein v. District of Columbia 346 F.2d 833 (1965); United States
v. One Parcel of Land, 186 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
19. See, e.g., United States v. 63.04 Acres of Land, 245 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Knoll-
man v. United States, 214 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land,
200 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Davis v. Reid, 264 Ala. 560, 88 So. 2d 857 (1956) ; Montery
County Flood Control & Water Conservation District v. Hughes, 20 Cal. Rptr. (1962);
United States v. 3595 Acres of Land, 212 F. Supp. 617 (D.C. Cal. 1962) ; Kennedy v. State
Highway Dept. 108 Ga. App. 1, 132 S.E.2d 135 (1963) ; Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways
v. Parker, 388 S.W.2d 366 (1963); Iowa Development Co. v. Iowa Highway Commission,
108 N.W.2d (Iowa 1961); Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 350 Mass. 485,
215 N.E.2d 652 (1966); Hance v. State Roads Commission, 221 Md., 164, 156 A.2d 644
(1959); Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Stout, 134 So. 2d 467 (Miss. 1961);
Re Lands of P. & M. Materials Corp., 38 Misc. 2d 734, 238 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1963) ; City of
Houston v. Collins, 310 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Morrison v. Cottonwood De-
velopment Co., 38 Wyo. 190, 266 P. 117 (1928).
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ciently similar as to make its sale price relevant in valuing the condemned
parcel.2" The court noted that such an approach would avoid an exclu-
sionary rule and also give the trial judge wide latitude with which to
exercise his discretion in passing judgement on whether an after-sale price
was in fact influenced by the condemnation.21 The court conceded that
this approach may prolong a trial by introducing the collateral issue of
whether property has been enhanced or diminished in value and stated,
"... that is not too large a price to pay in order to insure that no person's
property should be taken for the public use without his being justly
compensated and in order to protect the public against paying more than
the fair market value."22 The court emphasized that when the trial judge
exercises this discretion in a non-jury trial, as in the instant case, it would
be a better practice to admit the evidence and then weigh it, having re-
gard for the danger of artificial inflation or deflation.2"
It must be stressed that the instant case, along with the line of decisions
which admitted testimony regarding post-condemnation sales,24 does not
stand for the proposition that any and every post-condemnation sale may
be introduced into evidence if made within a reasonable time after the
taking. The burden of proof must be sustained by the party offering evi-
dence of a post-condemnation sale to establish that the property is com-
parable to the condemned parcel. If the particular facts of the case make
it self-evident that the condemnation had so measurably increased or
decreased the value of the property sold as to deprive it of the compara-
bility it might have once had to the condemned property, a ruling exclud-
ing evidence of the sale should be sustained. However, if the facts neither
make it self-evident or even remotely suggest that the sale price was
materially affected by the project which give rise to the exercise of the
eminent domain power, then the party must have an opportunity to estab-
lish a foundation of comparability upon which to predicate testimony of
the after-sale price. After an opportunity has been afforded to such party,
it is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether the party
sustained his burden of proof and therefore whether the post-condemna-
tion sale price shall be admitted as evidence of the fair market value of
the condemned property.25
20. 238 A.2d at 381.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See cases cited note 19 supra.
25. The court noted that although in the instant case the trial judge categorically re-
jected the appraisal by defendant's expert on the ground that the witness had given "great
weight" to the sale price of X property and that normally to reject critical opinion on an
unsound ground would constitute reversible error, since the defendant had not made an
offer of proof that the sale price of X property had not been materially affected by the
condemnation., the exclusion of such evidence did not constitute reversible error.
1967-19681
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The instant court found a previous Rhode Island case, Bruce v. State
Department of Public Works,26 (which sustained a ruling excluding evi-
dence of a post-condemnation sale price of abutting property) to be con-
sistent with the view expressed in Manning. The instant court stated that
the Bruce court sustained the ruling excluding evidence of the after-sale
price, not because of a general rule of exclusion, but because the particu-
lar facts of the case made it self-evident that the after-sale price reflected
an important enhancement of value because of the building of the project
which prompted the taking.27 The rule in Rhode Island is therefore that
the trial judge rather than automatically barring evidence of a sale of
comparable property merely because it occurred subsequent to condemna-
tion should first decide if the price paid was so materially distorted as to
deprive the property sold of its comparability.
The jurisdictions of Massachusetts, New York, and Texas, have indi-
cated that evidence of sales of other real property which took place subse-
quent to the valuation date fixed in the case at bar was admissible on the
issue concerning the value of the property in question because in these
jurisdictions there are decisions which have both admitted and excluded
evidence of post-condemnation sale prices depending on the circumstances
of the case.2 The above is also true in federal decisions in the second cir-
cuit.2 9 The jurisdictions of Alabama, California, Georgia, Kentucky, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Wyoming, and the fourth, sixth, and ninth
circuits in regarding this question have sustaianed rulings admitting testi-
mony concerning after-condemnation sales 30 In a number of jurisdictions
the courts have indicated that evidence of sales of other real property
26. 93 R.I. 466, 176 A.2d 846 (1961).
27. 238 A.2d at 381-82.
28. Massachusetts-post-condemnation sale excluded-Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338
Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209 (1959). Post-condemnation sale admitted-Roberts v. Boston, 149
Mass. 346, 21 N.E. 668 (1889); Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 350 Mass.
485, 215 N.E.2d 652 (1966); Paradysz v. Commonwealth, 202 N.E.2d 795 (1964).
New York-post-condemnation sale excluded-Latham Holding Co. v. State, 261
N.Y.S.2d 880, 209 N.E.2d 542 (1962). Post-condemnation sale admitted-Matter of City of
New York, 240 N.Y. 68, 147 N.E. 361 (1925); Four Park Avenue Corp. v. Lilly, 37 N.Y.S.2d
733 (1942); Dormann v. State, 167 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1957); Re Lands of P. & M. Materials
Corp., 238 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1963).
Texas-post-condemnation sale excluded-Taub v. Houston Independent School District,
339 S.W.2d 227 (1960). Post-condemnation sale admitted-City of Houston v. Collins,
310 S.W.2d 697 (1958); Housing Authority of Dallas v. Hubbard, 274 S.W.2d 165 (1954);
Hays v. State, 342 S.W.2d 167 (1960); Housing Authority v. Shambry, 252 S.W.2d 963
(1952); State v. Williams, 357 S.W.2d 799, (1962); State v. Dickerson, 370 S.W.2d 742
(1963).
29. Post-condemnation sale excluded-United States v. Meadow Brook Club, 259 F.2d
41 (1958) ; United States v. 1108 Acres of Land, 204 F. Supp. 737 (1962); United States v.
7.14 Acres of Land, 198 F. Supp. 120 (1961). Post-condemnation sale admitted-United
States v. 63.04 Acres of Land, 245 F.2d 140 (1957).
30. See cases cited note 19 supra.
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which took place subsequent to the valuation date fixed in the case at bar
was not admissible on the issue of the value of the land in controversy.
None of the cases discussed a hard and fast rule of exclusion, which pre-
cludes consideration of subsequent sales. However, the language of the
courts in Illinois, Arizona, the district court for the District of Columbia,
and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, indicate that these
courts are more readily susceptible to exclude testimony concerning post-
condemnation sales than the remaining jurisdictions (Louisiana, New
Jersey, Nebraska, Missouri, Montana, South Dakota, Virginia and the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit) which have excluded evidence of
post-condemnation sales. The courts in Arizona, Illinois, District of Co-
lumbia, and the Fifth Circuit although conceding arguendo the after sales
might be admissible in some situations, indicate that the mere taking of
property for the public use places such real estate in a different category
than the surrounding lands which will not be taken, and therefore which
will receive special benefits or burdens from the condemnation. Conse-
quently, the trial judge does not err in refusing to admit testimony which
occurred after the taking.3' Although conceding that there is no absolute
rule which precludes consideration of subsequent sales, it appears that in
Arizona, Illinois, District of Columbia, and the Fifth Circuit, evidence of
post-condemnation sales will not be admissible unless made almost simul-
taneously with the taking. The courts in Louisiana, New Jersey, Ne-
braska, Missouri, Montana, South Dakota, Virginia, and the First Circuit
excluded evidence of post-condemnation sale prices on the ground that it
was self-evident from the particular facts of the case that the after-sale
price reflected an important enhancement or depreciation of value because
of the building of the project which prompted the taking. 2 Such basis was
the reason given by the Rhode Island court in excluding after-sale prices
in the Bruce case. The opinions in these decisions, unlike the opinions in
the Arizona, Illinois, District of Columbia, and the Fifth Circuit, were not
motivated by the premise that as a general rule sales made after the date
of the taking are inadmissible per se, or by the implication that every
public project increases or decreases the value of the surrounding land.
For example, in May v. Dewey3" the Virginia Court excluded evidence of
31. Thomas v. Brown, 75 Ariz. 385, 257 P.2d 398, 400-1 (1953); City of Chicago v.
Blanton, 15 I1.2d 198, 154 N.E.2d 242, 244-45 (1958); Jayson v. United States, 294 F.2d
808, 810 (5th Cir. 1961); District of Columbia v. Lot 813 in Square 568, 232 F. Supp. 714,
719 (D.D.C. 1964).
32. United States v. Iriarte, 166 F.2d 800, cert. den. 335 U.S. 816 (1st Cir. 1948) ; State
Department of Highways v. Dodge, 168 So. 2d 430 (La. 1964); State Highway Comr. v.
National Fireproofing Corp., 127 N.J.L. 346, 22 A.2d 268 (1941); State Department of
Roads v. Mahloch, 174 Neb. 190, 116 N.W.2d 305 (1962) ; State ex rel. State Highway Com.
v. Bowling, 414 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. 1967); State Highway Com. v. Churchwell, 403 P.2d 751
(Mont. 1965); State Highway Com. v. Lacey, 113 N.W.2d 50 (S.D. 1967); May v. Dewey,
201 Va. 621, 112 S.E.2d 838 (1960).
33. 201 Va. 621, 112 S.E.2d 838 (1960).
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commerical property in the area of the land condemned which occurred
two years after the completion of the project which occasioned the tak-
ing. Also, in State ex rel. State Highway Com. v. Bowling, 4 evidence of
the terms of an executory contract of sale was excluded by the Missouri
Court in a condemnation case where the date of the contract was for more
than eight years after the taking. Whether the courts in these jurisdictions
would hold all sales made after the date of the taking to be inadmissible
on the ground that the sale reflected an increase or decrease in value due
to the condemnation, or whether these courts will follow the rationale of
the instant Rhode Island case, is open to question.
The court in the instant case did not set forth guidelines which may be
used for a determination as to whether the sale of alleged comparable
lands reflect an increase or decrease in value as a result of the condemna-
tion. Perhaps no adequate guidelines can be set up since a determination
of whether a piece of land is comparable to the condemned land neces-
sarily depends on the location and character of the property, and the
circumstances in each particular case. However, an analysis of the de-
cided cases reveals the following factors.
(a). The property must be sold within a reasonable time of the con-
demnation-the more remote in point of time the less likely the sale price
of such post condemnation sale lands will be of probative value in fixing
the value of the condemned land--especially if the lands in question are
situated in a highly developed area as contrasted with those lands which
are located in a rural area. 5
(b). The nature of the project (such as major highway projects) for
which the condemned land is taken is not of itself determinative of
whether the after sold land reflected an enhancement or diminuation in
value because of the condemnation.36 However, major projects which
occasioned the condemnation, especially if the project is being built in
a highly developed area or is a project which will greatly benefit the
community as a whole, will be more likely to be found to have affected
34. 414 S.W.2d 551 (1967).
35. For examples see City of Chicago v. Blanton, 15 Ill.2d 198, 154 N.E.2d 242 (1958)
(evidence of sale occurring some six months after the filing of the condemnation was ex-
cluded because the filing of the condemnation action was to acquire property for a school, and
the area around the condemned property had a serious school problem with the closest
public educational facility being a half mile away); Paradysz v. Commonwealth, 202 N.E.2d
795 (Mass. 1964) (evidence of sales of open farmland located adjoining to and within Y of
a mile from locus was admissible where sales were made up to five years after the taking).
36. See, e.g., cases admitting evidence of post-condemnation sales where the taking was
for a highway project-Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 350 Mass. 485, 215
N.E.2d 652 (1966) ; Hance v. State Roads Commission, 221 Md. 164, 156 A.2d 644 (1959).
Cases excluding evidence of post-condemnation sales where the taking was for a highway
project-District of Columbia v. Lot 813 in Square 568, 346 F.2d 833 (1965); May v. Dewey,
201 Va. 621, 112 S.E.2d 838 (1960).
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the value of surrounding lands than those projects which are of a smaller
nature. 7
(c). The property must be comparable to the condemned parcel in all
other respects .
3
The situation in Pennsylvania in regard to the admissibility of post-
condemnation sales is not clear. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
in the case of Simpson v. Pa. Turnpike Com. 9 that testimony regarding
the sale price of a piece of land sold several years subsequent to the con-
demnation was "manifestly incompetent. "40 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not discuss why such testimony was incompetent, either because
of an absolute rule in Pennsylvania which prohibits the introduction of
post-condemnation sales or because the facts in the Simpson case made it
self-evident that the condemnation greatly affected the value of the land
sought to be introduced as evidence of the fair market value of the con-
demned parcel. Eight years subsequent to the Simpson decision, Pennsyl-
vania in 1964 adopted an Eminent Domain Code.4 Section 705(2) (i) of
the Code provides:
A qualified valuation expert may testify on direct or cross-ex-
amination in detail as to the valuation of the property on a com-
parable market value which testimony may include, but shall
not be limited to, the price and other terms of any sale or con-
tract to sell . . .comparable property made within a reasonable
time before or after the date of condemnation. (Emphasis
added) .42
This section of the new Eminent Domain Code has not been judicially
interpreted. Under this section however, it is clear that the sale price, if
"made within a reasonable time" would be admissible even though the
evidence sought to be placed in the record is the sale price of a comparable
piece of property sold after the date of condemnation. However, if the
sale price of the otherwise comparable property were affected by the
37. Evidence of post-condemnation sales were excluded where condemnation was for
the purpose of acquiring property for a school where existing educational facilities were
some distance away-City of Chicago v. Blanton, 15 Ill. 2d 198, 154 N.E.2d 242 (1958);
Taub v. Houston. Independent School District, 339 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). Evi-
dence of a post-condemnation sale was admitted however, where condemnation was for the
purpose of building a courthouse-Roberts v. Boston, 149 Mass. 346, 21 N.E. 668 (1889).
38. In International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955), the court
excluded testimony concerning post-condemnation sale prices on the ground that the tracts
were too small in comparison to the tract condemned.
39. 384 Pa. 335, 121 A.2d 84 (1956).
40. Id. at 338.
41. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 26 § 1-101 to -903 (1964).
42. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 26 § 705(2)(i) (1964).
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condemnation, it would not and should not be admitted." The question
remains as to what constitutes a reasonable time and when is the after-
sale price affected by the condemnation. It is evident that the Pennsyl-
vania courts could easily circumvent section 705 (2) (i), if the court be-
lieved that any evidence of post-condemnation sale prices should be
excluded in determining the fair market value of the condemned property,
by excluding evidence of after sale prices on the ground that the after sale
was not made within a reasonable time of the condemnation or the con-
demnation had materially affected the sale price of the subsequently sold
property.
When the issue comes before the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania, or
any state or federal court of whether testimony concerning an after sale
price should be admitted into evidence, the better approach would be that
followed in the instant decision. Evidence of post-condmenation sale
prices should be admitted if the price paid was not materially distorted
by the comndemnation as to deprive the property sold of its compara-
bility.
Donald J. Burns
TORTS-STRICT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTs-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement 2d, Torts, Section 400,
which provides that "one who puts out as his own product a chattel
manufactured by another is subject to the same liability as though he
were its manufacturer." Strict liability now applies, not only to the
manufacturer of defective products unreasonably dangerous, but also to
distributors of such products.
Forry v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 428 Pa. 334, 237 A.2d 593 (1968).
In Forry a defective' tire was manufactured by B.F. Goodrich, distributed
43. Section 604 of the new Eminent Domain Code, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 26 § 604 (1964),
provides that any decline or increase in the fair market value caused by the general knowledge
of the imminence of the condemnation is to be disregarded in determining the fair market
value of the condemned parcel. The principle enunciated in section 604 (if the fair market
value of the property to be condemned is, prior to the date of condemnation, affected by the
imminence of the condemnation such change in the fair market value is to be disregarded)
would probably be applicable to section 705(2) (i), especially in view of such previously dis-
cussed cases as United States v. 63.04 Acres of Land, 245 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1957); Inter-
national Paper Company v. United States, 227 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1955) which held that
evidence of after sale prices are inadmissible if affected by the condemnation.
1. The court assumed a defect at 428 Pa. 334, 343, 237 A.2d 593, 598. Tire defects are a
major cause of accidents and most tire defects concern the tire bead-that portion of the
rubber and steel wire holding the tire to the rim. Philo, Automobile Products Liability
Litigation, 4 DUQUESNE L. REv. 181, 199 (1965).
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